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Abstract. Predicting the occurrence and spatial extent of extreme ava-
lanches is a longstanding issue. Using ﬁeld data pooled from vari-
ous sites within the same mountain range, authors showed that the
avalanche size distribution can be described using either an extreme
value distribution or a thick-tailed distribution, which implies that al-
though they are much larger than common avalanches, extreme ava-
lanches belong to the same population of events as “small” avalanches.
Yet, when looking at historical records of catastrophic avalanches, arch-
ives reveal that a few avalanches had features that made them “extra-
ordinary.” Applying avalanche-dynamics or statistical models to simu-
late these past events runs into considerable diﬃculty since the model
parameters or the statical properties are very diﬀerent from the values
usually set to model extreme avalanches. Were these events genuine
outliers (also called “dragon-kings”)? What were their distinctive fea-
tures? This paper reviews some of the concepts in use to model ex-
treme events, gives examples of processes that were at play in extreme
avalanches, and shows that the concept of dragon-king avalanches is of
particular relevance to describing some extreme avalanches.
1 Introduction
Avalanches are rapid, gravity-driven masses of snow moving down mountain slopes.
Like many other weather-related phenomena, snow avalanches can be characterized
in terms of frequency of occurrence and magnitude (even though this characterization
is far from simple and consensual). The estimation of the magnitude and frequency
is all the more important as in land use management in Western countries, risk maps
are based on period of return, impact pressure, and spatial extent of avalanches: ar-
eas of land are partitioned into zones of diﬀerent degree of danger depending on the
occurrence rate and intensity of historical avalanche events or possible events. Since
the early developments of avalanche zoning in Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s
(a procedure that was subsequently imported to most European countries), diﬀerent
approaches have been proposed to estimate the features of infrequent avalanches [1].
Of particular relevance here is the prediction of extreme avalanches, i.e. avalanches
a e-mail: christophe.ancey@epfl.ch
118 The European Physical Journal Special Topics
whose frequency of occurrence is very low and damage potential is very high. Al-
though avalanche-dynamics and statistical models are able to provide decent predic-
tions, there are a number of events, for which the predictive capability of current
models is clearly insuﬃcient [2]. Surprisingly enough, the status of these events is
seldom if ever discussed. Like for other weather-related processes, these events may
be regarded as anomalies or “outliers” that do not call into question the use of models
to predict extreme avalanches. Are they really phenomena that are “extra-ordinary”
and thus not signiﬁcant statistically? Do they provide evidence that some events
cannot be predicted using current models or even that they are unpredictable? In
this respect, February 1999 oﬀers an interesting case study. In Europe, the Alps ex-
perienced heavy snowfalls and three major avalanche cycles, with many avalanches
hitting villages and roads. In spite of the death toll (69 people were killed in their
dwellings or on the road), hazard mapping was regarded as successful since very few
avalanches went beyond the predicted limits and damage was less widespread than
for earlier catastrophic winters (e.g., in 1954 and 1951) [2,3]. To explain the failure of
zoning procedures, two alternatives were put forward: errors could have been made in
mapping extreme avalanches (e.g., ignoring past events) or insuﬃcient knowledge of
the physical processes (e.g., the motion of the airborne part of the avalanche) could
have led to underestimate the avalanche extent. A third track, explored in this paper,
is to consider that some extreme avalanches have their own dynamics, which makes
them diﬀerent from other avalanches.
The objective of this paper is to examine why certain past avalanche events were
“extra-ordinary”, i.e., their features stood out from those exhibited by “ordinary”
avalanches. We will see that these extraordinary avalanches can be termed genuine
outliers or dragon-kings as suggested by Sornette [4] since they cannot be predicted
using standard models or past observations (a more operational deﬁnition is given
at the end of the introduction), but in spite of this, there is a rationale behind their
occurrence, which means that ultimately they may be predictable if a proper compu-
tational framework is set up. In this paper, the intent is not to develop new theories
or concepts, but to interpret historical records to ﬁnd out distinctive features in their
physical behavior and conditions prior to their release. In this respect, the paper
is closer to an opinion paper than a data-based paper. One reason for this is the
scarcity of relevant data, which makes the application of simple theories (e.g., uni-
variate extreme value theory) diﬃcult and jeopardize any recourse to more elaborate
and realistic theoretical frameworks (e.g., multivariate extreme value theory). Despite
this lack of quantitative analysis, I hope that the paper can provide proof of concept
and open up the discussion on the relevance of “dragon-kings” in the modeling of
extreme avalanches.
Section 2 outlines the current approaches to computing infrequent avalanches
and shortly comments on how outliers can be generated or modelled within these
approaches. The common belief is that extreme avalanches are caused by extreme
snowfalls. While this view holds true for many catastrophic avalanches [2,5–7], there
has been ample empirical evidence in recent years that like other multi-component
systems, “extra-ordinary” snow avalanches may result from a chain of “ordinary” cir-
cumstances (none of them being extreme when considered independently), as shown
for instance by the 1999 Pe´clerey avalanche (see § 4.2). Section 3 gives typical exam-
ples of extreme avalanches caused by extreme snowfalls, but also shows that heavy
precipitation is not an indispensable element to producing extreme events. Section 4
describes mechanisms that best explain the occurrence of extraordinary avalanches
through a series of brieﬂy documented historical events.
We have so far avoided the diﬃcult problem of deﬁning an avalanche outlier pre-
cisely. As shown in the review paper by Sornette [4], the deﬁnition of outliers is likely
to be more context-dependent than universal. An outlier is usually deﬁned as an event
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that departs markedly from the rest of events from a statistical standpoint (i.e., the
event is distant from the probability distribution that underlies the observed sample).
While outlier occurrence is often seen as the hallmark of heavy-tailed distributions
(e.g. Zipf’s distribution), it may also indicate either that observations were spoiled by
measurement errors or that the sample was not identically distributed (i.e, it resulted
from a mixture of populations). To distinguish between these various possibilities,
Sornette [4] suggests calling “dragon-king outliers” all events that do not belong to
the same population as the rest of events. In this respect, providing evidence for
dragon-king occurrence amounts to identifying two sub-populations in the observed
sample. While this statistical deﬁnition of outliers can be successfully applied to many
physical systems, it runs into diﬃculty when one is concerned with snow avalanches.
A ﬁrst diﬃculty lies in the multivariate nature of avalanches. Summarizing all the
avalanche dynamics through a single random variable (e.g., volume, distance traveled
by the avalanche, energy) is an oversimpliﬁcation of reality that may lead to contra-
dictory conclusions depending on the variable selected to capture the bulk dynamics.
Then, although avalanche databases are available worldwide, data are mostly of de-
ceptive quality (missing data, signiﬁcant errors in geographic information, etc.) and it
is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd sites for which avalanche data exist in suﬃcient number to be
exploited statistically. For these reasons, a loose deﬁnition of avalanche outlier will be
used in the rest of this paper: for a given path, a genuine outlier or dragon-king is an
event whose features (volume, impact pressure, distance, etc.) are markedly diﬀerent
from those observed, in particular other rare events.
2 Modeling major and extreme avalanches
While scientists have collected ﬁeld data since the very beginning of the scientiﬁc
investigations of snow avalanches in the late 19th century, it was not until the 1970s
that statistical exploitation of avalanche data was undertaken. Fo¨hn and Meister [8]
applied survival analysis and extreme value theory to a sample of 26 events that oc-
curred in the Salezertobel avalanche path (Grisons, Switzerland) from 1950 to 1981.
They found that a Gumbel distribution ﬁt fairly well the empirical distribution of
runout distance (point of furthest reach). A clear impediment to statistical inter-
pretation is that there are not many avalanche paths for which observations exist
in suﬃcient number (and quality). To get round this diﬃcult, Lied and Bakkehøi
[9] assumed a regional homogeneity in the avalanche behavior for a given mountain
range, which allowed them to pool the data from various paths in a common database.
Then, using regression techniques, they obtained the relation between the runout dis-
tance and various key variables of the path proﬁle. When applied to practical cases,
this method has the disadvantage of regarding the runout distance as ﬁxed for a
given path whereas it is likely to be a random variable that varies from one event
to another one1 Elaborating on this method, McClung [10,11] applied extreme value
theory to (scaled) runout distances. In particular, he showed that when scaled by
a characteristic length, the runout distance xstop has a statistical distribution that
can be described by a Gumbel law. More recently, Keylock [12] applied the peak-
over-threshold method to a runout-distance sample including 199 avalanche events in
Iceland and found that this sample was properly described by a Pareto distribution
with a negative shape exponent ξ = −0.614; this ﬁnding implies that there is an
upper bound in the statistical distribution of scaled runout distances. Other authors
1 In fact, this is partially true since a premise of the underlying statistical model is that
the residuals from the linear regression model are normally distributed, which allows for
some randomness in the runout distribution.
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focused on diﬀerent variables to study the statistical properties of snow avalanches.
For instance, Birkeland and Landry [13] and Faillettaz et al. [14] considered the size
of the start zone and found that the size distribution is characterized by a power law
behavior (with an exponent ranging from −0.63 to −1.2); both McClung [15] and
Bair et al. [16] focused on the slab thickness in the start zone and found that the slab
thickness is either log-normally or Fre´chet distributed. None of these studies reported
the existence of outliers.
An alternative to statistical models is given by the deterministic approach in
which the avalanche features are deduced by solving the mass and momentum bal-
ance equations [17]. Avalanche-dynamics models usually introduce a friction law,
which describes the avalanche/ground interaction as well as energy dissipation (in-
side the avalanche). In most models, this law includes empirical frictional parameters,
which have been ﬁtted from ﬁeld observations [18–20]. To compute long-return-period
avalanches, engineering methods such as the Swiss guidelines suggest default values
of the frictional parameters and assume that the period of return of the avalanche is
that of the snow depth increase over the last three days preceding the release [21].
Within this computational framework, avalanche outliers may be caused by excep-
tional snowfalls; they may also arise from strong nonlinearities in the solutions to
the governing equations. For instance, if we consider an S-shaped avalanche path,
i.e., a path whose longitudinal proﬁle exhibits a plateau area with low inclination,
avalanches must have suﬃcient energy to cross the plateau area; there is thus a thresh-
old eﬀect in the distribution of runout distances between the avalanches that come
to a halt on the plateau and those which cross it and continue their descent.
Another approach has recently emerged: the so-called “conceptual approach”2
combines statistical and deterministic tools. From avalanche-dynamics models, it re-
tains that physical processes can be idealized in the form of mathematical operators
that relate input and output variables. From statistics stems the idea that avalanche
features such as volume and runout distance are random variables, whose statisti-
cal distribution can be derived from stochastic simulations. Within this approach,
as stated by Meunier and Ancey [22], extreme avalanches are expected to have the
same behavior as observed events and a priori cannot generate dragon-king events.
In principle, it should, however, possible to include additional rules that make the
emergence of genuine outliers possible. This approach includes many variants: Monte
Carlo simulation [22–25], nonlinear and logistic regressions [26–28], Bayesian inference
[20,29–32], which have attracted growing attention in recent years.
3 Main paradigm
The traditional view is that most catastrophic avalanches follow the same basic prin-
ciple: fresh snow accumulates on the slope of a mountain until the gravitational force
at the top of the slope exceeds the binding force holding the snow together (this is an
oversimpliﬁed description of the physical processes, see [33] for further information).
A solid slab of the surface layer of snow can then push its way across the underly-
ing layer, resulting in an avalanche. The failure may also arise from a temperature
increase, which reduces snow cohesion.
To illustrate this paradigm, let us take the case of an avalanche in the Combe de
l’Aiguille in La Foux d’Allos, a ski resort in the southern French Alps (between Digne
and Nice). This ski resort (1815masl) underwent heavy snowfalls from 1 December
to 3 December 1976. The totals of snow were approximately 225 cm within 3 days,
but within one night (from 2 to 3 December), snowfalls dropped 150 cm, which is the
2 A term coming from hydrological studies of the watershed response to rainfalls.
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Fig. 1. Return level plot: relation between the daily snowfall and the period of return (only
the yearly maxima have been plotted) for la Foux d’Allos (France). The empirical period of
return is computed as Ti = na/(1 + i) where i is the rank of the snowfall (the sample was
ordered in ascending order) and na is the number of years of the record, here na = 42 yr
(from 1968 to 2009) [34]. The solid line is the Fre´chet distribution adjusted on the data using
the likelihood maximum technique [34]: S = μ−σ(1− ln(− ln(1−T−1))−ξ)/ξ with ξ = 0.10,
μ = 40.4 cm, and σ = 15.3 cm; the standard errors are, respectively, 0.10, 2.62, and 1.95.
The thin dashed lines represent the 95% conﬁdence interval. The thick dashed line is the
Gumbel distribution S = μ− σ(ln(− ln(1− T−1)) with μ = 41.3 cm and σ = 15.9 cm.
record for this ski resort and one of the highest values ever recorded in the French
Alps. During the snowfalls, stormy winds from the South caused intense drifting so
that huge snow accumulations formed on the lee slopes. A tremendous avalanche
released as a result of snow accumulation and destroyed 11 out of the 19 pylons of the
newly built cable car. As shown by Fig. 1, the 3 December 1976 snowfall clearly stands
out from other snowfalls. The 1976 snowfall was a meteorological outlier, which also
caused the largest avalanche in the Combe de l’Aiguille in terms of snow volume and
damage.
Another historical example is given by the avalanches that occurred in late March
1914 in Chamonix-Mont-Blanc (France). Winter 1913–1914 was cold and dry, with
scarce snowfalls over the Alps until early March 1914. After a mild spell, the temper-
atures dropped again in mid March and snow fell intermittently; on 25 and 26 March
1914, the snowfall intensity increased signiﬁcantly. In Chamonix town (1050masl),
the total amount was 90 cm within 2 days (as against 130 cm from March 15 to 26
March 26). In the upper part of the Chamonix valley, 200 cm of snow were observed
from 25 to 26 March (as against 265 cm from 15 to 26 March). For Chamonix town,
the period of return was estimated at 100 yr for the 2-day snowfalls. In contrast, for
the upper Chamonix valley, the period of return was much longer than 100 yr for
the 2-day snowfalls (an extrapolation of the extreme-value distribution ﬁt on the Le
Tour data gives an estimate of 1500 yr!). These snowfalls caused huge avalanches that
swept through the valley, causing substantial damage to forests and dwellings. One
particular feature of this event was not only the intensity of the snowfalls, but also
the number of extreme avalanches triggered the same day and their spatial extent.
Extreme avalanches often result from heavy snowfalls, but they may also be
the outcome of an unfortunate chain of circumstances. In pathological cases, small
snowfalls can produce extreme avalanches (in terms of the distance traveled by
the avalanche). On 23 February 1996, a 16-cm snowfall was suﬃcient to release a
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Fig. 2. The forest above Chamonix was destroyed by the numerous avalanches that occurred
on 26 March 1914. Photography taken by G. Tairraz on 27 March 1914 (courtesy of RTM
Haute-Savoie).
major avalanche that killed one skier in Val-d’Ise`re on a cross-country skiing track
[35]. Except for the latent snow instability, no meteorological factor (e.g., blowing
snow or mild spell) could explain the exceptional character of the avalanche. On 9
February 1999, an avalanche occurred in the Pe´clerey avalanche path above Montroc
in the upper Chamonix valley. The avalanche killed 12 people in their houses and was
regarded as an extreme event (period of return estimated at 150 yr). This avalanche
resulted from heavy snowfalls from 5 to 9 February, which brought 178 cm in Mon-
troc (1400masl). Although this precipitation was intense, it was not exceptional as
the period of return was approximately 5 yr [36]; aggravating circumstances that can
explain the exceptional character of this avalanche include blowing snow, cold tem-
perature, and the weather conditions prior to February 1999, which contributed to a
poor snowpack consolidation (with formation of loose snow at the base of the snow
cover) [36,37].
Avalanche outliers are not always the consequence of extreme meteorological con-
ditions. It is thus worthwhile analyzing documented avalanche events to unravel the
underlying processes. Here, four main processes are suggested to explain outlier oc-
currence: change in bed path roughness (§ 4.1), trajectory switch (§ 4.2), diversion by
former deposits (§ 4.3), and self-induced deforestation (§ 4.4). This description is not
comprehensive; for instance, processes such as snow entrainment are of paramount
importance to explain the extent of major avalanches [38,39]. Note that on most oc-
casions, the exceptional nature of avalanche outliers results from the combination of
several processes rather than a sole process.
4 Extreme avalanches
4.1 Change in the path roughness
Path roughness is one of the key factors that control energy dissipation in avalanches.
Usually, when suﬃciently thick, the snowpack ﬂattens out the ground irregularities,
which reduces the ﬂow resistance exerted by the bottom. When the avalanche path
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Fig. 3. Proﬁle of the avalanche path (solid line) along the Saint-Cle´ment stream. The dots
represent the points of arrest of avalanches recorded in the French avalanche database.
follows the bed of a mountain stream, obstacles such as blocks, steps, and kinks may
increase ﬂow resistance signiﬁcantly. During normal winters, the snowpack is not suf-
ﬁciently thick to ﬁll the gaps and smooth the path. However, when several avalanches
occurred within a short length of time, the avalanche deposits can progressively ﬁll
the gaps and reduce ﬂow resistance. This ﬁlling and smoothing process may also occur
with a single avalanche of very large volume.
An example is given by the site of Pointe de la Grande Journe´e (2460 masl)
above Albertville (Savoie, France) and the 3 March 1923 avalanche. Let us start with
the meteorological conditions at that time: 1922 was a very wet year in the Alps,
with annual precipitation totals that could be as high as 3 times the average values.
From 1 Nov. 1922 to 15 March 1923, the amount of snow in Mouˆtiers (480masl)
was 1023 cm (as against 728 cm on average) [40]. During the night from 2 March
to 3 March, one or several avalanches released from the vast western slopes of la
Grande Journe´e and converged toward a canyon draining the Saint-Cle´ment water-
shed (the canyon entrance is at an elevation of 1700m). Although surrounded by
steep slopes, the canyon bed is characterized by moderately steep longitudinal slopes
(44% between 1700 and 900m in elevation as against 25% between 900 and 500m).
It is usually covered with large boulders, logs, and debris transported by torrential
ﬂoods. Mild slope and bed roughness explain why most avalanches come to halt in
the canyon without reaching the alluvial fan. At an elevation of 500m, the canyon
widens out and opens onto a vast alluvial fan at shallow slope (8% between the
top of the alluvial fan and the point of conﬂuence). Figure 3 reports all the events
recorded since 1906 in the French avalanche database called Enqueˆte Permanente
des Avalanches (EPA). On average, the avalanches came to a halt at an elevation of
932m (i.e., a distance of x¯stop = 2620m from the Pointe de la Grande Journe´e), as
seen on Fig. 3, a few avalanches were able to travel very long distances (more than
4 km) over moderately steep slopes. The 3 March 1923 avalanche stopped at the foot
of the alluvial fan (at an elevation of approximately 360m), i.e. it traveled a long
distance (more than 600m) on an unconﬁned slope, whose inclination never exceeds
10%. Compared to other historical events and with model predictions, this avalanche
is really an outlier. For instance, if the Voellmy model is used to compute the runout
distance, the friction parameter μ must be as low as 0.08 whereas the Swiss guidelines
give 0.155 as the minimum value for extreme avalanches [21]. The 1923 avalanche was
not only remarkable in terms of runout distance, but also in terms of snow volume:
with a deposited volume ranging from 1.2 to 2.4×106m3 (depending on the observer),
this avalanche was the largest ever observed in this site (the average deposit volume
is 238’000m3 for this path). This volume was suﬃciently large to recalibrate the
stream cross-section (eye witnesses indicated that in places, the deposit height
reached 40m!).
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Fig. 4. View of the Saint-Cle´ment watershed and the 1999 avalanche (courtesy of RTM
Savoie, photograph by Ste´phane Roudnistka).
4.2 Change in the trajectory
Avalanche trajectories are usually controlled by topography (inclination, degree of
conﬁnement, etc.). This holds particularly for low-speed, friction-dominated ava-
lanches, but is partially true for high-speed avalanches, for which inertial eﬀects can
counteract the gravitational forces. With experience, a practitioner can “read” the
landscape and predict the avalanches paths, including the runout distance, with some
degree of accuracy. In this respect, many avalanche extents are predictable, at least
qualitatively. There are, however, some circumstances in which a particular avalanche
can switch trajectory, for instance by jumping from one couloir to another one.
An example is given by the Pe´clerey avalanche in the Chamonix valley, which
was already mentioned in § 3. As shown by Fig. 5, the Pe´clerey avalanche path refers
to the path followed by avalanches released in the north-west face of the Bec du
Lachat (2572m) and taking the direction of Le Tour, a village at the end of the
Chamonix valley. Underneath the start zone (ranging from 2250 to 2570masl), there
is a vast area characterized by mild slopes (20◦ on average) and bumpy surface (due
to a rock glacier), which exerts suﬃcient ﬂow resistance to slow down or even stop
most avalanches. At the elevation of 1800m, there is a break in the slope, with a
signiﬁcant slope increase (from 18◦ to 45◦), which causes the avalanches to accelerate
vigorously. When reaching the valley bottom, the avalanches come to a halt on a
vast alluvial fan (1390m). In February 1999, the avalanche released below the Bec
du Lachat took another trajectory: involving dry, low-friction snow, the avalanche
reached a suﬃciently high velocity to go straight ahead through the bumpy plateau
[36]. Although the mild slope caused substantial snow deposition and deceleration,
part of the avalanche ﬂux arrived at the slope break and accelerated again, entraining
all the snowpack made up of recent snow and old cohesionless snow. When it reached
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Fig. 5. The Pe´clerey avalanche path. The solid line represents the usual trajectory followed
by avalanches (in direction of Le Tour), while the dashed line stands for the exceptional path
taken by the 1999 avalanche (toward Montroc).
the valley bottom, the avalanche was suﬃciently vigorous to go up the opposite slope,
sweeping through 20 dwellings.
4.3 Deviation by former deposits
How an avalanche comes to an arrest is a complex process that depends a great deal
on snow rheological behavior, topographical constraints, and avalanche features [41].
High-speed avalanches involving dry snow tend to form widespread and thin deposits,
whereas low-speed wet-snow avalanches are prone to form thick and narrow deposits,
often exhibiting ﬁngering instabilities, i.e. lobes that can individualize from the rest
of the avalanche and take diﬀerent directions. On most occasions, the behavior of
avalanches in their runout phase can be assessed qualitatively, but a few events had
characteristics that were barely predictable. This is the case when several avalanches
occur within a short period on the same path; their deposits can modify the local
topography and divert subsequent avalanches onto other directions. Former avalanche
deposits may also obstruct the avalanche path (e.g., a mountain stream) or make
avalanche catching dams ineﬃcient (by ﬁlling the storage volume upstream of the
barriers).
An example is given by the Geschinen avalanches in February 1999 [2]. Geschi-
nen is a small village in the Goms valley (Wallis, Switzerland), which was protected
from avalanches by a 4–6-m high barrier. As conspicuous on Fig. 6, three avalanches
occurred within 2 days (22 and 23 February 1999). The ﬁrst one was a high-speed
powder snow avalanche, whose deposit crossed the Rhone river (at the bottom of
the picture). The second avalanche was a wet snow avalanche, which formed a thick
deposit at the top of the alluvial fan, just at the outlet of the couloir. The third
avalanche was also a wet snow avalanche, but with a very diﬀerent behavior since
the avalanche traveled a long distance, separated into two branches, and damaged
one house (the avalanche barrier’s eﬃciency became low as a result of former de-
posits). One possible explanation lies in the role played by snowballs and levee for-
mation (lateral deposits). Indeed, the runout distance can be signiﬁcantly enhanced
as a result of levee formation limiting lateral spreading and energy dissipation by
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Fig. 6. Left: aerial view of the Geschinen avalanche deposits; the ﬁrst deposit is delineated
by the dashed red curve, the second by the green curve, and the third indicated by blue
arrows (courtesy of the Swiss federal topographic service). Right: the Mont Cuchet site; the
two avalanche paths through the forest are marked by the arrowed curves.
channelizing the ensuing ﬂow. Usually, dry-snow avalanches do not form snowballs,
but since the ﬁrst avalanche crossed the Tru¨tzi lake (located at the base of the starting
area) and entrained large volumes of water, the liquid water content in the snowpack
was abnormally high and promoted snowball formation in subsequent avalanches.
4.4 Forest destruction
Forests are usually an eﬃcient natural barrier against avalanches by hindering their
release and, to some degree, increasing ﬂow resistance. For many centuries, it was
the only protection of Alpine villages against avalanches, as illustrated by the “Ban-
nwald” (“forbidden forest”, literally) protecting Andermatt (Canton of Uri, Switzer-
land) since the Middle Ages. For this reason, lands located underneath forested areas
are often regarded as safe.
There are, however, many historical examples of avalanches that made their own
way through dense forests and caused damage. For instance, for a very long time until
1981, inhabitants of Saint-E´tienne-de-Cuines in the Maurienne valley (Savoie, France)
thought that their dwellings were not threatened by the Mont Cuchet avalanches since
the slopes were covered with dense and old forests. As shown by Fig. 6, the snow-
capped Mont Cuchet (2102masl) emerged 150m (in elevation) above forested slopes.
In February 1978, after a snow tempest, avalanches were released from the summit
and in spite of the low elevation diﬀerence between the top and tree line, they acquired
suﬃcient energy to break the trees over a long distance (approximately, 80% of the
forest was destroyed). In late January 1981, heavy snowfalls caused new avalanches,
which beneﬁted from the gaps in the forest and swept through the remaining forest,
cutting the roads and impacting a few houses (2 people killed).
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5 Concluding remarks
We have shown in this paper through a series of historical examples that some events
were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the rest of the events in the same path. Are these
“extra-ordinary” events “dragon-kings” (or genuine outliers)? Let us answer this ques-
tion by looking at the various meanings of outliers.
In the statistical literature, the occurrence of outliers is often related to measure-
ment errors. In the ﬁeld of avalanches, long-term ﬁeld surveys are plagued by errors.
For instance, if we take the French avalanche database (EPA) which started in the
early 1900s, many observation errors stemmed from the topographic map used by
the rangers in charge of the survey, which was of very poor resolution until 1976.
Elevation errors of ±100 m were common in the position of points of furthest reach.
Deposit volumes were observed to the naked eye, which resulted in tremendous uncer-
tainties in the avalanche size estimation. Missing and censored data are also substan-
tial impediments to statistical analysis. Even with well documented events, thorough
analysis reveals that on many occasions, observations were of uneven quality and
full of inconsistencies, which may be impossible to clarify, in particular many years
after the avalanche occurrence. In spite of all these problems and the current im-
possibility of providing quantitative evidence, there is clear historical evidence that
“extra-ordinary” events occurred.
Outlier occurrence may also indicate that the variables characterizing avalanches
are distributed from a heavy-tailed law. The scarcity of avalanche data for a given
path has prompted researchers to pool data from various sites to derive empirical dis-
tributions. Whereas Birkeland and Landry [13], Faillettaz et al [14] provided evidence
of thick tails in the empirical distribution of avalanche size, Keylock [12], who focused
on the runout distance, came to an opposite conclusion: the scaled runout distance
sample is Weibull-distributed, i.e., extremes are bounded. Note that for earthquakes,
when data are pooled from diﬀerent faults, they collapse onto a well-deﬁned power-
law distribution, showing no evidence of dragon-king events, whereas when data stem
from a single fault, they may exhibit dragon-king events [42]. In this respect, pooling
data from various sites may bias the statistical interpretation by smoothing out the
tail of the empirical distribution.
A third explanation for outlier occurrence is that the extraordinary events belong
to a population that diﬀers from that of the ordinary events. It is diﬃcult to address
this question since pinpointing two (or more) sub-populations within an observation
sample of low size is delicate. For weather-related variables such as rainfall, obser-
vations may not be distributed from a unique law, e.g., in southern France, rainfalls
are caused by North-Atlantic and Mediterranean depressions, whose features are very
diﬀerent. In contrast, for snow avalanches, the physical behavior is often the same
for major avalanches occurring in the same site. For instance, for the Saint-Cle´ment
avalanche paths (see § 4.1), all avalanches that arrived onto the alluvial fan were
large volume, wet snow avalanches. A priori, there would be no reason for consider-
ing several sub-populations for avalanches occurring along the same path. Yet, taking
a closer look at the historical examples shows that most extraordinary events shared
a common feature: they modiﬁed the boundary conditions of the site (by altering
roughness, decreasing ﬂow resistance, and/or modifying local topography). The only
exception is the Pe´clerey avalanche (trajectory switch), which is more related to a bi-
furcation in the avalanche behavior under certain conditions. Both cases (interaction
with the boundary conditions, bifurcation) are two of the many scenarios that lead
to the emergence of dragon-king outliers according to Sornette [4].
The discussion around the existence of genuine avalanche outliers is not a purely
intellectual question. It has many important repercussions in avalanche hazard map-
ping. For the 1999 Pe´clerey avalanche, which killed 12 people and destroyed 20 houses
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(see § 4.2), predictability was at the core of the debate in the justice court that had to
ﬁnd who was responsible for the disaster. The point is that engineers in charge of risk
mapping seek the maximum extent of past events and/or use standard engineering
methods (e.g., the Swiss guidelines [21]) to determine the areas exposed to avalanches
and for many of them, extreme avalanches are just avalanches that are bigger than
their siblings. Realizing that some sites can produce dragon-king avalanches is thus
of paramount importance.
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